Political scientists have long been interested in the American public's foreign policy mood, but they have typically separated the microlevel question (who's more likely to support isolationism?) from the macrolevel one (when does isolationism's popularity increase?), even though public opinion is inherently a multilevel phenomenon, as the answers to these two questions interact. Showing how multilevel models can deal with the effects of time rather than just space, I find that both guns and butter drive foreign policy mood, but in different ways. When economic assessments sour, the public's appetite for isolationism increases, but the impact of these individual-level perceptions is constrained by aggregate economic conditions, which are sufficiently salient that they are accessible irrespective of knowledge. The nature of the international security environment, however, predominantly affects foreign policy mood amongst high-knowledge individuals, thereby suggesting that low-and high-knowledge individuals' foreign policy views are shaped by different situational cues.
F oreign policy mood is a multilevel phenomenon.
1 The public's attitude towards how large a role the United States should play in the world-what Pollins and Schweller (1999) call ''the oldest debate in American foreign policy''-is a function of both micro-and macrolevel variables, both individual characteristics and contextual factors. Ever since Almond argued that the American public's response to international events ''has no depth and no structure '' (1950, 232) , political scientists have been fascinated by the question of what drives foreign policy preferences (Holsti 2004; Rathbun 2007) , but their answers have typically focused on only one level of analysis at a time, with half looking predominantly at the beliefs, perceptions, and attributes that make some individuals more likely to support introverted foreign policies than others, and the other half investigating foreign policy ''mood swings,'' or the circumstances in which inward-looking foreign policies are more or less popular (Holmes 1985; Klingberg 1952; Rieselbach 1960; Schlesinger 1986 ).
Yet if public opinion is shaped both by individual characteristics and by the environment the public is facing, we not only need to take both sets of factors into account, but also acknowledge causal complexity, using statistical techniques that allow us to model these ''man-milieu'' interactions (Sprout and Sprout 1957) directly. I therefore employ multilevel modeling on 14 waves of ANES data to analyze the impact of both micro-and macrolevel determinants of the American public's support for isolationism from 1980 to 2008. At the microlevel, I find that the distinction between foreign and domestic policy preferences is often overstated, in that foreign policy views are shaped by the same economic assessments that scholars of political behavior have long understood to be a major determinant of candidate evaluation and voting behavior: when national economic assessments worsen, citizens turn inwards, and the public appetite for ''extroverted'' foreign policies decreases. Politics may stop at the water's edge, but the economic evaluations that shape public opinion do not.
Extending the analysis to the macrolevel, I find that the impact of these subjective perceptions on foreign policy mood is constrained by economic realities on the ground. In this sense, foreign policy is not just a multilevel phenomenon in that it is forged by factors at multiple levels of analysis, but also in that it displays causal complexity, as micro-and macrolevel variables interact. Moreover, since contextual phenomena can only influence the foreign policy preferences of citizens who are aware of them in the first place, I find evidence that low and high-knowledge individuals rely on different sets of cues when forming their foreign policy views: the international security environment predominantly impacts foreign policy mood amongst knowledgeable citizens, whereas domestic economic conditions are sufficiently salient that they are accessible to all individuals and constrain subjective economic assessments accordingly. Both guns and butter affect foreign policy mood, then, but the latter's effect is consistent, whereas the former's effect is contingent.
Foreign Policy Mood as a Multilevel Phenomenon
Policy makers and political scientists in the United States have largely been interested in foreign policy mood for two very different reasons, so it is not surprising that the extant academic literature reflects two very different methodological approaches. Because there is nearly unanimous agreement amongst foreign policy elites that the country should pursue a major role in world politics (Page and Barabas 2000) , the reemergence of isolationism has long terrified policy makers, even if its actual role in the history of U.S. foreign policy is overstated (Braumoeller 2010) . Just as one of the major mandates of the Council on Foreign Relations in the 1940s was to ''enlighten'' the American public by mobilizing internationalist sentiment (Parmar 1999) , neoconservative think tanks like the Project for a New American Century were formed in the late 1990s precisely to prevent conservatives from veering towards ''neoisolationism.'' One strand of the political science research on foreign policy mood has thus focused on a microlevel approach, using individual-level polling data to investigate who is more or less likely to support isolationist or inward-looking foreign policies: men versus women, Republicans versus Democrats, Midwesterners versus Northeasterners, and so on (e.g. Holsti 2004; Rieselbach 1960; Urbatsch 2010) . A separate body of work has explored foreign policy mood with a macrolevel approach, using aggregate data collected over time-public opinion trends, content analyses of Presidential speeches, etc.-to study isolationism in the context of foreign policy mood swings, examining the circumstances under which inward-looking foreign policies are more or less popular (Holmes 1985; Klingberg 1952; Pollins and Schweller 1999; Schlesinger 1986 ). In 2010, both former President George W. Bush and Senator John McCain expressed concern about isolationism's increasing popularity (McKenzie 2010; Thiessen 2011) , so this longitudinal question is as relevant today as it was after the Second World War, when critics like Gabriel Almond and George Kennan argued that the volatility of public opinionoscillating from isolationism to interventionism and back again-constituted the major threat to the viability of democratically-governed foreign policy (Holsti 2004) . Although subsequent research has painted a far more flattering picture of the public (Jentleson 1992) , this second tradition tries to model this volatility by exploring the conditions in which aggregate support for extroverted foreign policies waxes and wanes (Nincic 1997; Page and Shapiro 1992) , as in thermostatic models of public opinion (Wlezien 1995) .
In reminding us that the public neither acts as a homogenous whole nor forms its foreign policy preferences in a vacuum, these two research traditions have made vast contributions to the study of the American public's foreign policy mood, but largely in isolation from one another. As a result, we've come to treat ''who's more likely to support isolationism?'' and ''when does isolationism's popularity increase?'' as independent questions, even though the answer to one is likely to affect the other. In this sense, even if we typically study micro-and macro-opinion separately (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) , public opinion is inherently a multilevel phenomenon (McLeod, Pan, and Rucinski 1995) . If the public's mood is shaped both by individual-level attributes and the broader climate the public is collectively reacting to, studies that focus only on factors at a single level of analysis-or incorporate variables at both levels but do not let them systematically interact-will mask causal heterogeneity (Western 1998) , ignoring what the early foreign policy analysis literature used to call ''man-milieu'' interactions (Sprout and Sprout 1957) ; the extent to which contextual determinants of foreign policy mood are in fact conditional upon individual-level factors, and vice versa. Indeed, we have theoretical reasons to believe that support for isolationism is determined by factors crossing multiple levels of analysis, such that foreign policy mood is best studied with statistical techniques explicitly designed to capture these crosslevel interactions, thereby revealing the more complex dynamics through which preferences are shaped. In the discussion below, I argue that foreign policy mood is driven by three factors: individual-level economic perceptions, the objective economic climate the country faces, and the nature of the international security environment.
Economic Considerations
In his analysis of foreign policy mood swings, Almond (1950, 65) raised the possibility that the public's mood was driven by economic factors, a relationship operating at two different levels of analysis. First, at the microlevel, a large literature in political behavior shows that dour economic assessments have major impacts on policy preferences (Feldman 1982; Fiorina 1978; Kinder 1981) . The state of the national economy is highly salient, such that economic perceptions affect everything from attitudes towards immigration (Citrin et al. 1997) , to trust in government (Mishler and Rose 2001) , but their impact has yet to be tested in the foreign policy domain. Second, at the macrolevel, a large IR literature ranging from Kondratieff cycles (Goldstein 1985) to ''war chest'' theories (Blainey 1973) links the state of the national economy to the likelihood of a country embarking on outsized military adventures, as reflected in the classical idea of pecunia nervus belli-''money is the sinew of war.'' I therefore argue that the public appetite for extroverted foreign policies is driven at the microlevel by perceptions of the state of the national economy (such that individuals who perceive the economy as faring poorly will look less favorably upon an outward-looking foreign policy) and at the macrolevel by the actual economy itself (such that the public as a whole will display less foreign policy extroversion when the economy sours). The logic at both levels of analysis is the same, reflected in the fact that global activism is expensive: hegemonic stability theorists compare the United States to Goliath (Mandelbaum 2005) precisely because maintaining your vision of the international system doesn't come cheap. SIPRI estimates American military expenditures in 2010 reached $698 billion; the Department of Defense's 2010 Base Structure Report states that DoD currently occupies over 300,000 buildings around the world, stretching out over 2.2 billion square feet. Carrots may be cheaper than sticks, but nation building and humanitarian aid still involve opportunity costs, as money spent on hospitals and schools abroad comes at the expense of hospitals and schools at home. Advocates of an outward-looking foreign policy may argue that the costs and consequences of retrenchment exceed those of maintaining the status quo (Muravchik 1996) , but this only reinforces the point that extroverted foreign policies involve paying costs in the first place, which implies that when the economy weakens, the opportunity costs of an outward-looking foreign policy increase (Nincic 1997) , and the American public will be less interested in footing the bill.
H1: Microlevel: Positive economic assessments are associated with greater support for an extroverted foreign policy, while negative economic assessments are associated with greater support for the United States ''staying home.'' H2: Macrolevel: positive economic conditions-as measured by low inflation and unemployment rates-are associated with greater support for an extroverted foreign policy, while negative economic conditionsas measured by high inflation and unemployment rates-are associated with greater support for an introverted foreign policy.
In a complete information model of rational choice, it would be redundant to test both the micro-and macrolevel hypotheses, since subjective assessments of the health of the economy should be identical to conclusions reached from actual economic data (such as information about inflation, unemployment, and so on). Given limited knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and motivated reasoning (Lebo and Cassino 2007) , however, it is likely that there is an ''elasticity of reality'' (Baum and Groeling 2010) , whereby subjective assessments and objective indicators will often diverge. Thus, there are two additional conclusions we can draw about the impact of economic perceptions on foreign policy mood. First, individual-level assessments should still exert a statistically and substantively significant impact on foreign policy mood even when objective or macrolevel economic conditions are controlled for-that is, we will still find support for Hypotheses 1 even in a hierarchical model that also tests for Hypothesis 2. Second, although economic perceptions may be distorted by partisanship and other individual-level characteristics (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000) , they should on the whole be tethered to actual facts on the ground. Thus, the impact of microlevel assessments on foreign policy mood is likely to be conditional on macrolevel economic circumstances: when economic times are good, microlevel assessments should exert a large impact on foreign policy mood, with respondents with favorable economic perceptions being more likely to advocate an outward looking foreign policy than those with unfavorable assessments. When economic times are bad, however, a ''reality constraint'' should kick in, and individuallevel perceptions should cease to display a statistically significant effect on foreign policy mood. Subjective making sense of isolationismeconomic assessments may have important effects, but not unconditional ones.
H3:
Crosslevel: The impact of positive economic assessments on foreign policy mood is conditional on the presence of positive economic conditions (and thus, there exists a significant interaction effect between subjective and objective economic indicators).
War and Knowledge
The third type of factor affecting foreign policy mood is the nature of the international security environment, which ''third-image'' accounts in IR emphasize, as do Krasner (1978, 342-46) and Nincic (1988) in their discussions of foreign policy mood swings. The IR literature on public opinion paints two competing pictures of the public. The image depicted by the ''rally around the flag'' effect, in which external threats cause the public to stand behind the President and support the use of force (Mueller 1971) , implies that a more conflictual international environment should boost foreign policy extroversion. Rallies, however, are by definition short-lived phenomena, and in the long run the public appears to be highly sensitive to the costs of war (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010) , such that IR scholars have found that the advantages of democracy in war decline over time (Bennett and Stam 1998) . If the public is less likely to support extroverted foreign policies when economic circumstances sour, an increasingly belligerent international system is likely to have a similarly discouraging effect in the long run, deterring support for highly active foreign policies by rendering the costs of internationalism more salient. We can operationalize this in a number of ways: not just by the number of disputes the United States finds itself involved in, but also their intensity, with higher levels of hostilities, or greater number of casualties, associated with an introverted foreign policy mood. Outcomes should also matter: although the public may be willing to pay the costs of an extroverted foreign policy when it sees signs that the country is successful at it, a string of defeats should have the same effect as an economic downturn, causing the public to turn inwards and focus on problems at home.
H4a: Macrolevel: The more belligerent the international system-as measured by the number and intensity of the militarized interstate disputes in which the United States has been involved-the less the public will favor an outward-looking foreign policy.
H4b: Macrolevel: The more disputes the United States fails to win, the less supportive the public will be of an outward-looking foreign policy.
Yet as Rosenau (1965) reminds us, although a few prominent international events consume an enormous amount of the public's attention, foreign policy issues on the whole tend to be less salient than their domestic counterparts. High-profile foreign policy events may affect voting behavior (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989) , but most foreign policy issues are seen as ''hard'' issues rather than ''easy'' ones (Carmines and Stimson 1980) , far removed from most Americans' daily lives (Moisy 1997) . Positing that the public will respond in the manner predicted by Hypothesis 4a assumes that citizens are aware of these events in the first place, when in fact higherknowledge individuals-or members of foreign policy ''issue publics''-are far more likely to be exposed to information about the dynamics of the international security environment than their lowerknowledge counterparts (Zaller 1992) . Compared to most events on the world stage, domestic economic conditions are far more accessible: as Enns and Kellstedt (2008) argue, one need not be an economist to have a basic sense of how well the economy is performing, since inflation and unemployment have sufficiently stark effects on the daily lives of ordinary citizens that the knowledgeable and ignorant alike will be aware of the state of the national economy at some level, even if their judgments are sometimes distorted. If the international security environment is more likely to be accessible to high-knowledge individuals than low-knowledge ones, we can refine Hypothesis 4a by offering two conditional hypotheses, in which the impact of conflict in the international system predominantly affects the foreign policy mood of high-knowledge citizens.
H4c: Crosslevel: The more belligerent the international system-as measured by the number and intensity of the militarized interstate disputes in which the United States has been involved-the less highly knowledgeable individuals will favor an outward-looking foreign policy.
H4d: Crosslevel: The more militarized interstate disputes the United States fails to prevail in, the less highly knowledgeable individuals will favor an outward-looking foreign policy.
Data and Variables
Data for this study are chiefly drawn from 14 waves of the American National Election Studies (ANES) conducted bianually from 1980 to 2008-apart from 2006, when no ANES time series study was conducted. ANES data are ideal for our purposes because they repeat the same questions over a series of nationally representative samples, allowing us to investigate the joint impact of micro-and macrodeterminants of foreign policy mood, testing hypotheses that could not be studied with aggregate data alone.
Dependent Variable
Since foreign policy mood represents a general posture that constrains more specific policy preferences (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) , it is best measured by questions fielded repeatedly that tap into broader isolationist sentiments, rather than narrower questions measuring attitudes towards specific conflicts or policies. The ANES includes a measure of isolationism-''This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world''-that serves as a relatively parsimonious measure of foreign policy extroversion, recoded 0 for respondents who agreed with the statement (and thus support an introverted or inward-looking foreign policy), and 1 for respondents who disagree (who thus call for an extroverted or outward-looking foreign policy). To establish convergent validity, a series of ordered probit and OLS models was estimated to ensure that the isolationism measure adequately predicts more specific foreign policy preferences. Even when controlling for party ID, political ideology, and a host of demographic variables, foreign policy extroverts were substantially more likely to support a wide series of specific foreign policy priorities-ranging from fighting terrorism to combatting hunger, preventing nuclear proliferation to promoting human rights-thereby confirming that our general measure of foreign policy mood accurately predicts support for specific extroverted foreign policies, regardless of whether they are hawkish or dovish in nature. 
Microlevel Independent Variables
The ANES asks respondents to provide a series of economic evaluations, including a retrospective sociotropic evaluation, indicating whether ''the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse,'' and a prospective sociotropic assessment measuring whether respondents expect the economy to get better, stay the same, or get worse for the next 12 months.
3 I use these questions to produce two independent variables, measuring subjective retrospective, and prospective economic assessments, respectively, scaled so that higher values correspond with more negative assessments.
Microlevel Control Variables
In addition to the economic assessments, I include a number of control variables. First, it is plausible that foreign policy mood is affected by an evaluation of the American position in the international system. Just as scholars of political behavior study ''internal political efficacy'' (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991)-a concept that measures individuals' beliefs about their own abilities to engage with and participate in political life-one can imagine such a thing as ''state efficacy,'' a construct that measures individuals' beliefs about their state's performance on the world stage. The Carter administration's turn towards a less muscular foreign policy, for example, largely reflects a reaction to the events in Vietnam, and social psychologists in the past several decades have shown increased interest in beliefs in ''collective efficacy'' as a source of behavior (Bandura 2000) . The ANES also asks respondents to assess the American position in the world, measuring whether they felt that during the previous year, the United States' position had become weaker, stronger, or stayed the same-a question I use as a measure of state efficacy, coding those participants who believed the American position had strengthened as being higher in state efficacy. Because of the conceptual connections between personal efficacy and collective efficacy, and because early political behavior research indicated that political efficacy and self-esteem were related to internationalism (Campbell et al. 1960; Sniderman and Citrin 1971) , I also measure personal efficacy with an additive scale drawn from the standard internal political efficacy NES items (''Public officials don't care much what people like me think,'' ''People like me don't have any say about what the government does,'' and ''Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on'').
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See section 2 of the online appendix. Since public opinion scholars often distinguish between a number of different faces of internationalism (Holsti 2004) , it is notable that our measure predicts support for both militant and cooperative internationalism.
Additionally, I include a dichotomous variable measuring whether respondents indicated that economic issues were the most important problem the country is facing, since the impact of economic assessments on foreign policy mood may depend on how salient these concerns are. For political knowledge, I use the interviewer's postquestionnaire assessment of the respondent's general level of information about politics, commonly used in political behavior research and found to perform similarly to factual recall-based questionnaires (Zaller 1992, 338) . 4 For partisanship, I use the standard 7-point measure of party identification (from strong Democrat to strong Republican), as well as a dichotomous ''Inpartisan'' variable measuring whether respondents' partisan identification is that of the party of the sitting President. I also use a variety of standard demographic variables, controlling for political ideology (from strong liberal to strong conservative), gender, age, income, and level of education.
Macrolevel Variables
Finally, I include a set of contextual variables to model changes in the economic and security environment across each year of the study. To capture the macrolevel economic climate, I include measures of the national inflation and unemployment rates. To control for the security environment, data from the MID3 data set (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) were used to produce four indicators. First, since the ANES is conducted biannually, the first variable measures the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDS) in which the United States has participated in the previous two-year period. Second, because not all conflicts exact an equal toll, the level of hostilities incurred in all of the conflicts in the two-year period is summed to produce a measure of the intensity of the disputes. A similar procedure is used to measure the level of casualties the United States sustained in the disputes, which serves as another indicator of conflict intensity. Fourth, since it is also likely that the disputes' outcomes will affect the public's mood (Eichenberg 2005) , an additional measure tallies the number of disputes in which the United States failed to win, under the assumption that defeats or stalemates will loom larger than victories. 6 Finally, because not all of the individual-level variables of interest were included in ANES studies in each year, rather than employ listwise deletion and throw out large amounts of information, multiple imputation was conducted using Amelia II (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2009) , producing 10 imputed datasets, described in further detail in section 3 of the online appendix.
Results: A Multilevel Analysis
As pooled cross-sectional data, the biannual ANES results are likely to display temporal heterogeneity: domestic politics, economic conditions, and the international security environment all change over time, and statistical models that do not account for these dynamics produce biased estimates. There are a number of different ways political scientists control for the effects of time, most frequently with year fixed effects, or splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Keele 2008) . The limitation of these approaches is twofold. First, they treat the effects of time as a statistical nuisance to be corrected, rather than a feature of our data we should try to explain: they tell us that years differ without telling us why. Second, they relegate the effects of time to the intercept, assuming all our other coefficients have constant effects over time-a premise that should be tested rather than assumed. Hierarchical linear, or multilevel, models, can avoid both of these pitfalls and thus offer a new way of addressing an old problem. Multilevel models are frequently used in political science to study the impact of context on actors' behavior, but usually the context is understood in spatially differentiated terms: students nested in schools, voters nested in states, survey respondents nested in countries, and so on (e.g., Hutchison and Gibler 2007 ). Yet time is no less a contextual variable than space, so we can also 4 In 1988, the postquestionnaire knowledge assessment was not included, whereupon I rely on a prequestionnaire knowledge measure instead.
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The data were derived from the Current Population Survey and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since the ANES data are collected over a four-month period, the average unemployment and inflation levels for this September-December period were used. use multilevel models to provide a more theoretically satisfying way to deal with temporal heterogeneity in pooled public opinion data. Unlike fixed-effect models, which allow intercepts to vary for each year but also assume constant effect sizes, a multilevel approach allows for both slopes and intercepts to vary, avoiding effect heterogeneity bias while letting macrolevel phenomena explain why the effect of microlevel variables vary across time.
7 Thus, a series of multilevel models are presented in two stages: first, employing a random coefficient model to focus on the role of individual-level predictors like subjective economic assessments, and then second, using a set of full hierarchical linear models to examine how these individual-level predictors interact with the domestic economic and international security contexts.
Before conducting the analyses, however, it is important to note that although the multilevel nature of the data-with over twenty-five thousand respondents taking part in a total of 14 waves-allows for the simultaneous study of both micro-and macrolevel determinants of foreign policy mood, its asymmetric structure (with a large number of respondents nested in a small number of waves) produces asymmetric leverage for questions of statistical inference (Snijders 2005) , even though, as Anderson and Singer (2008) note, multilevel models borrow across lower-level units in making their estimates, such that a multilevel logistic model on 12 level-two groupings with nearly 2000 level-one units in each is still more precisely estimated than an ordinary logistic regression conducted with an N of 12. To mitigate statistical power issues, I adopt two modeling strategies. First, to preserve degrees of freedom for the macrolevel analyses, I restrict the number of contextual factors included in the model at any given time. Second, I adopt different standards of statistical significance for each level of analysis. Given the large number of respondents in the study, the chief risk with the microlevel analyses is a Type I error, so I impose stringent standards of statistical significance when analyzing the impact of individual-level variables, adopting a threshold of p , 0.001. However, because of the small number of years under investigation, the foremost concern with the macrolevel analyses is a Type II error, so I accept lower standards of statistical significance for macrolevel variables than for individual-level ones, lowering the threshold to p , 0.10 to avoid missing effects that are substantively large but imprecisely measured due to data limitations (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008) .
Individual-Level Predictors of Foreign Policy Mood
To establish a baseline for the analyses, I estimate a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with year random effects simply to determine how much of the variation in foreign policy mood is due to differences over time, rather than across individuals. The results show that the public is less volatile than critics like Kennan believed, as there is over 12 times as much variation in foreign policy mood within each wave of the data as there are between them; there is far more division within the public in 1992, say, than between the public in 1988 and the public in 2002. 8 Since the variation within time periods cannot be explained by contextual factors that are largely constant within each wave, the model shows that most of the variation in foreign policy preferences is due to individual-level rather than contextual-level factors. Accounts of foreign policy mood that rely largely on aggregate time-series data (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992) thus appear to overlook an important part of the story.
I therefore begin the multivariate analyses by focusing on the role of individual-level factors. Model 1 of Table 1 estimates a random coefficient logistic regression model that controls for a series of microlevel predictors: sociotropic economic assessments, state efficacy, political knowledge, partisan identification, in-partisanship, whether the economy was deemed the most important issue, and a range of demographic characteristics (age, gender, income, education), along with a random effect on personal efficacy, which allows its relationship with foreign policy mood to vary across time.
9 Retrospective economic evaluations display the significant relationship 7 See section 1 of the online appendix for a further discussion of the merits of a hierarchical approach, visual tests for heterogeneity, as well as the econometric specifications for all the types of multilevel models presented below. The intraclass correlation (r) indicates that 7.3% of the variation in foreign policy preferences come from variation across years; 95% CIs around the intercept suggest that the average level of foreign policy extroversion falls within a 21.6% range in 95% of the cases. Because the models are estimated using a penalized quasi-likelihood, likelihood ratio tests cannot be used to adjudicate model fit, so these statistics serve as baselines for subsequent analyses: in general, the smaller the intraclass correlation and tighter the CIs around the intercept, the better-fitting the model. Alternative model specifications with random effects on other predictors failed to improve model fit; see Table 1 of the online appendix for details. with foreign policy mood predicted by Hypothesis 1: respondents who reported that the economy was better in the past year are 4.6% more likely to favor an outward-looking foreign policy than respondents who said the economy was worse. Prospective economic assessments, on the other hand, are not significant; when it comes to foreign policy mood, Americans are evidently peasants rather than bankers (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992) , basing their preferences upon an assessment of how the economy has performed in the past, rather than expectations of future performance. Importantly, the effect of retrospective economic assessments exceeds that of partisanship; although Republicans generally favor an extroverted foreign policy more than Democrats, in a multivariate context, strong Republicans were only 3.2% more likely to espouse foreign policy extroversion than strong Democrats, indicating a relatively strong bipartisan consensus on foreign policy mood. At the same time, the significant effect of the in-partisan dummy variable means that partisans were 2.5% more likely to endorse extroverted foreign policies when the President came from their own political party, offering some support for Urbatsch's (2010) conclusion that measures of isolationism also capture partisan opposition to the President. In general, though, partisanship's effects are relatively weak and stable across time when compared to the other predictors in the model, creating an image of ''parallel publics'' moving in tandem (Page and Shapiro 1992) . Although age, gender, and liberal-conservative ideology lacked statistically significant effects, two other demographic characteristics-income and educationdid not, with the wealthiest respondents 7.7% more likely to be foreign policy extroverts than the poorest, and the most educated 17.0% more likely to be foreign policy extroverts than the least educated, an effect that holds even when controlling for knowledge (which itself is associated with an 8.1% jump in foreign policy extroversion when the highest-knowledge respondents are compared with their low-knowledge counterparts). The two efficacy variables also have substantively and statistically significant effects. Those who believed the American position in the world had strengthened in the past year and who thus should be high in state efficacy were 6.3% less likely to call for the United States to stay home, while interestingly, those high in personal efficacy were 17.7% less likely to do so, suggesting that assessments about the U.S. position in the world help shape foreign policy mood, but less so than beliefs about one's own capacity to exert political influence.
Macrolevel Predictors of Foreign Policy Mood
The question remains, however, whether contextuallevel factors also have an effect, such that rather than merely controlling for heterogeneity, we can explain it with substantive predictors-and do so more efficiently and systematically than if macro-and microlevel variables were included in a pooled model. Economic assessments play a role in driving foreign policy mood, but to what extent is their effect contingent on aggregate economic indicators like inflation and unemployment? And what role do events in the international security environment play? Models 2-4 of Table 1 seek to answer the first question by presenting a series of analyses in which inflation, the unemployment rate, and the consumer confidence index are interacted with retrospective sociotropic economic evaluations. In order to control for the security context while still preserving degrees of freedom, I include a composite measure of the security environment, since all four security variables are highly intercorrelated (a 5 0.812). Supporting Hypothesis 3, all three interactions with economic assessments are statistically significant (p , 0.051, p , 0.083, and p , 0.101 for the interactions with inflation, unemployment, and consumer confidence, respectively), and predicted probabilities for the interactions are depicted in Figure 1(a) . The y-axis of the top row of panels in Figure 1(a) plots the predicted probability of an extroverted foreign policy mood, while the x-axis depicts the range between the minimum and maximum values of each macrolevel indicator, and the thickness of the lines indicates the valence of sociotropic economic evaluations, with the thinner line referring to favorable assessments, and the thicker line denoting less favorable ones.
In all three cases, the effect of the interaction between the macrolevel economic indicator and microlevel economic assessments is the same: the ''worse'' the national economic indicators are, 10 the less impact the subjective economic assessments have on an individual's foreign policy mood. The dotted vertical line indicates the point on the x-axis where the impact of subjective assessments is no longer statistically significant at the p , 0.05 level, corresponding to the p-values from joint hypothesis tests displayed in the bottom panel and described in detail in section 6 of the online appendix. When inflation sits slightly above 1%, respondents who suggested the economy had gotten much better were 6.9% more likely to advocate extroverted foreign policy preferences than those who suggested the economy had gotten much worse; once inflation passes 6%, however, we can no longer conclude with 95% certainty that subjective assessments have any effect whatsoever on foreign policy mood-evidence of a ''reality constraint'' (Baum and Groeling 2010) that is also apparent with unemployment and consumer confidence. Indeed, the lower the unemployment Two points are worth noting here. First, supporting Hypothesis 3, the economic context acts as a conditionally activated reality constraint: the worse inflation, unemployment, and consumer confidence get, the less impact individual subjective assessments have. Second, supplementary analyses in section 8 of the online appendix find that these conditional effects are largely independent of political sophistication: although unemployment's impact on foreign policy mood varies slightly with political knowledge, neither inflation nor consumer sentiment display this effect. Like Enns and Kellstedt, I therefore find that political knowledge plays only a minor role in moderating the impact of objective economic circumstances. However, I also suggest that the impact of economic indicators is contingent upon subjective economic assessments; unless these indicators are high, subjective evaluations of the economy do more of the heavy lifting.
The question remains whether the external security environment displays the same mechanisms at work. I therefore use data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDS) from the MID3 dataset to examine whether the number and nature of disputes taking place in the previous two-year period affect foreign policy mood, focusing on four criteria in particular: the number of disputes the United States participated in, the overall level of escalation of the disputes, the overall level of fatalities the United States endured, and the number of disputes the United States failed to win. Against Hypotheses 4a and 4b, none of the security variables exert significant main effects on foreign policy mood (see section 8 of the online appendix), but Table 2 interacts each of the variables with political knowledge in sequence, controlling for unemployment as a measure of the domestic economic climate. 12 The interaction between knowledge and casualties fails even generous standards of statistical significance, but the other three interactions are depicted in Figure 1(b) .
Although the interaction terms fall just outside the p , 0.10 threshold (p , 0.118 for the number of MIDS, p , 0.133 for hostility levels, and p , 0.107 for failures to win), the results are highly sensible and offer preliminary support for Hypotheses 4c and 4d: the international security environment tends to be further removed from the daily realities of domestic economic conditions, so low-knowledge individuals are predominantly unaffected by the dynamics of American militarized interstate disputes. Higher-knowledge individuals, on the other hand, respond to a greater number of disputes, or disputes marked by higher levels of escalation-since these are the disputes likely to receive higher attention-by professing a reduced likelihood of support for an outward-looking foreign policy. Thus, although knowledge seems not to affect the impact of domestic economic indicators, it does heighten the impact of the security context. Regardless of what kind of impact ''third image'' factors have on U.S. foreign policy, their effect on the mood of the U.S. public seems to be limited, detectable only amongst the most knowledgeable. The notable exception concerns failures to win: although the most knowledgeable respond to defeats and stalemates by reducing their support for outward-looking foreign policies at the greatest rate (by about 5.3%), news of the absence of victory trickles down to the lowest knowledgeable as well, who respond with around a 1.4% drop in foreign policy extroversion. 13 Although the relatively small number of years under investigation suggests some caution should be taken with the contextual results, the above analyses all paint a similar picture: the more the public is reminded of the costs of outward-looking foreign policies, the more it wants to turn inwards.
Conclusion
Political scientists have long been interested in what drives the American public's foreign policy mood, but have usally gone about addressing only half of the question at a time, either focusing on the individuallevel factors that make certain members of the public more likely to advocate isolationist views or using aggregate time-series data to look at the contextuallevel factors that make isolationism more popular during certain periods. Yet given that foreign policy mood is inherently a multilevel phenomenon, we need to look at how both micro-and macrolevel factors interact in structuring foreign policy preferences. In this respect, the study has methodological ramifications beyond the foreign policy realm: political scientists are by now familiar with many of the advantages of multilevel modeling, but they have used them almost exclusively to deal with the effects of space rather than those of time. Public opinion scholars can gain additional traction by integrating both micro-and macro-opinion into one larger analytic framework, not just controlling for temporal heterogeneity, but modeling it theoretically to show how the two levels interact.
Substantively, the analyses presented above counter Almond and Kennan's premise of a sharp divide between domestic and foreign policy issues, suggesting that foreign policy mood is also shaped by the economic assessments that figure so prominently in domestic politics: the more negative the economic evaluations, the less supportive Americans are of pursuing an extroverted foreign policy. That said, the domestic realm's impact on public opinion differs from that of its international counterpart in one key respect: as Rosenau argued in the 1960s, what sets foreign policy issues apart is the extent to which they are removed from daily life. Thus, although I find that both contextual economic and security factors matter, they do so in very different ways: economic conditions like unemployment, inflation, and consumer confidence are salient and accessible to everyone, and as such, are less likely to depend on political sophistication in order to affect foreign policy preferences. Most interstate disputes, on the other hand, are less prominent and predominantly affect the foreign policy preferences of higher-knowledge individuals.
In light of the Almond-Lippmann consensus and the pessimism that continues to pervade the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, the implications here for policy makers are interesting. First, domestic economic considerations exert a stronger impact on foreign policy mood than does the dynamics of the international security environment, to which-in most cases-only the most knowledgeable seem to respond. Second, knowledge is a doubleedged sword. After decades of having been taught the dangers of isolationism (Parmar 1999) , the educated and knowledgeable public is far more likely to be supportive of an outward-looking foreign policy, but they are also more likely to be aware of negative developments on the world stage and thus more likely to turn inwards in response. The interesting exception to the public's general indifference towards international affairs concerns failures to win, which affect even the low-knowledge group. The results presented here thus extend Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler's (2009) findings of the public as ''defeat phobic'' to include not just defeats in battle but also failures to prevail in disputes that fall short of all-out war. Third, the public's reactions do not reveal a sterling realist temperament: if the United States has a compelling interest in an outward-looking foreign policy, presumably this interest should remain invariant to domestic economic considerations. The results presented above portray an image of a public that, once the ''rally around the flag effect'' subsides, responds to conflict by disengaging rather than standing firm, decreasing its support for outwardlooking foreign policies when outcomes occur that reinforce their cost. 13 Supplementary analyses in section 7 of the online appendix operationalize the international security environment differently by focusing on the subset of international conflicts and crises salient enough to be classified as ''rally events'' (Newman and Forcehimes 2010).
Finally, the foreign policy establishment has routinely expressed concern about the specter of isolationism reemerging amongst the American people. The above analyses suggest that much of this pessimism is unwarranted: most of the variation in foreign policy mood occurs within time periods rather than between them, suggesting that policy makers should be more concerned about polarization than ''mood swings'' across time. Indeed, the popularity of outward-looking foreign policies is noteworthy, given the number of transformative moments in U.S. foreign policy that took place in the study's time frame: the fall of détente and renewal of tensions during the Reagan administration, the end of the Cold War and emergence of a new multilateral security environment in the 1990s, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so on. Although the last wave of the study was conducted before the rise of the Tea Party sparked concerns about the return of isolationism, the persistent popularity of outward-looking foreign policies-at minimum, individuals advocating extroverted foreign policies outnumber their introverted peers by a ratio of 2 to 1-suggests that at least up until late 2008, a fairly large and supportive base existed for American involvement on the international stage, in line with arguments that American exceptionalism is alive and well. Policy makers may have to work to sell specific missions or interventions to a skeptical public, and deep divisions may exist on issues like multilateralism, but the Jeffersonian sentiments that characterized much of early American foreign policy discourse seem to have fallen by the wayside. Gray's assessment that ''America's style encompasses oscillations between extremes, and both extremes are quintessentially American' ' (1981, 44) may be true when it comes to how the country conducts its foreign policy, but does not describe the public's foreign policy mood over the past three decades, as the demand for internationalism largely continues to hold.
